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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
This case is on review from a final order of the Board of Trustees of the School 
and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (the "SITLA Board") in a formal 
adjudicative proceeding conducted by the SITLA Board pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
53C-l-304(2)-(4) (1997). Section 53C-l-304(5) provides that an aggrieved party to a 
final decision by the SITLA Board may obtain judicial review of that action pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1988). Jurisdiction of this appeal is present in the 
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 and Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102(3)(e)(iii). The former statute provides a general grant of jurisdiction to Utah's 
appellate courts for review of final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings. The latter statute provides that the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction 
over final orders in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with the School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees. By Order dated November 5, 2007 this court 
determined that this case should be retained in the Supreme Court rather than transferred 
to the Court of Appeals. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the SITLA Board correctly dismiss NPCA's claims that the 1987 
Exchange was unlawful on the basis of inadequate consideration to Garfield County 
because NPCA's claims were: (a) beyond the scope of the 1993 Remand; (b) beyond the 
SITLA Board's jurisdiction; and (c) barred by the doctrine of res judicata? 
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Standard of Review 
In order for NPCA to be granted relief, NPCA has the burden of showing that it 
was "substantially prejudiced" by the SITLA Board's erroneous interpretation or 
application of the law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(4) (1988). The SITLA Board's 
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Utah Chapter Sierra Club v. Utah Air 
Quality Board, 2006 UT 74, t 9, 148 P. 3d 960, 965 (Utah 2006). 
II. Did NPCA have either the legal right to intervene or standing to challenge 
the adequacy of the McConkie Appraisal? 
Standard of Review 
The SITLA Board's legal conclusions concerning the right to intervene and 
standing are reviewed for correctness. Utah Chapter Sierra Club, 2006 UT 74, fflf 13-15, 
148 P. 3d 960, 965-7 (Utah 2006). 
III. If NPCA's claims were properly before the SITLA Board, was the 
McConkie Appraisal legally sufficient to support SITLA's conclusion that the 1987 
exchange had resulted in fair value to the school trust, as required by the 1993 Remand? 
Standard of Review 
In order for NPCA to be granted relief, NPCA has the burden of showing that it 
was "substantially prejudiced" by the SITLA Board's erroneous interpretation or 
application of the law. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(4). Where the agency has been 
given explicit or implicit discretion under the operative statute, where the agency 
possesses expertise concerning such provisions, or where the agency is otherwise in a 
better position than the courts to assess the law due to its experience with the relevant 
' ' ' . 2 
subject matter, the agency's findings must be rationally based, and are set aside only if 
they are imposed arbitrarily and capriciously or are beyond the tolerable limits of reason. 
Utah Chapter Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board, 2006 UT 74, fflf 9-10, 148 P. 3d 
960, 965 (Utah 2006), citing Associated General Contractors v. Bd. Of Oil, Gas & 
Mining, 2001 UT 112, Tf 18, 38 P. 3d 291 (Utah 2001). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
Federal Statutes 
Utah Enabling Act Act of July 16, 1894, 28 Stat. 107, Section 6: 
That upon the admission of said State into the Union, sections 
numbered two, sixteen, thirty-two, and thirty-six in every township 
of said proposed State . . . are hereby granted to said State for the 
support of common schools. 
Utah Enabling Act Act of July 16, 1894, 28 Stat. 107, Section 10: 
That the proceeds of lands herein granted for educational purposes 
... shall constitute a permanent school fund, the interest of which 
only shall be expended for the support of said schools, and such land 
shall not be subject to pre-emption, homestead entry, or any other 
entry under the land laws of the United States, whether surveyed or 
unsurveyed, but shall be surveyed for school purposes only. 
Utah Constitution 
Article XX, section 2: 
Lands granted to the State under Sections 6, 8, and 12 of the Utah 
Enabling Act, and other lands which may be added to those lands 
pursuant to those sections through purchase, exchange, or other 
means, are declared to be school and institutional trust lands, held in 
trust by the State for the respective beneficiaries and purposes stated 
in the Enabling Act grants. 
-> 
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Utah Code Ann. § 53C-1-102 (1994): 
§ 53C-1-102. Purpose. 
(1) (a) The purpose of this title is to establish an administration and 
board to manage lands that Congress granted to the state for the 
support of common schools and other beneficiary institutions, under 
the Utah Enabling Act. 
(b) This grant was expressly accepted in the Utah Constitution, 
thereby creating a compact between the federal and state 
governments which imposes upon the state a perpetual trust 
obligation to which standard trust principles are applied. 
(c) Title to these trust lands is vested in the state as trustee to be 
administered for the financial support of the trust beneficiaries. 
(2) (a) The trust principles referred to in Subsection (1) impose 
fiduciary duties upon the state, including a duty of undivided loyalty 
to, and a strict requirement to administer the trust corpus for the 
exclusive benefit of, the trust beneficiaries. 
(b) As trustee, the state must manage the lands and revenues 
generated from the lands in the most prudent and profitable manner 
possible, and not for any purpose inconsistent with the best interests 
of the trust beneficiaries. 
(c) The trustee must be concerned with both income for the 
current beneficiaries and the preservation of trust assets for future 
beneficiaries, which requires a balancing of short and long-term 
interests so that long-term benefits are not lost in an effort to 
maximize short-term gains. 
(d) The beneficiaries do not include other governmental 
institutions or agencies, the public at large, or the general welfare of 
this state. 
(3) This title shall be liberally construed to enable the board of 
trustees, the director, and the administration to faithfully fulfill the 
state's obligations to the trust beneficiaries. 
Utah Code Ann. § 53C-1-302 (1997): 
§ 53C-1-302. Management of the administration — Trust 
responsibilities. 
(1) (a) The director has broad authority to: 
(i) manage the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration in fulfillment of its purpose; and 
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(ii) establish fees, procedures, and rules consistent with general 
policies prescribed by the board of trustees. 
(b) The procedures and rules shall: 
(i) be consistent with the Utah Enabling Act, the Utah 
Constitution, and policies of the board; 
(ii) reflect undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries consistent with 
the director's fiduciary duties and responsibilities; 
(iii) subject to Subsection (2), obtain the optimum values from use 
of trust lands and revenues for the trust beneficiaries, including the 
return of not less than fair market value for the use, sale, or exchange 
of school and institutional trust assets; and 
(iv) be broadly construed to grant the board, director, and 
administration full discretionary authority to manage, maintain, or 
dispose of trust assets in the manner they consider most favorable to 
the beneficiaries. 
(2) The director shall seek to optimize trust land revenues 
consistent with the balancing of short and long-term interests, so that 
long-term benefits are not lost in an effort to maximize short-term 
gains. 
(3) The director shall maintain the integrity of the trust and 
prevent, through prudent management, the misapplication of its 
lands and revenues. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(4) (2006): 
This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior to the beginning of 
an adjudicative proceeding, or the presiding officer during an 
adjudicative proceeding from: . . .(B) granting a timely motion to 
dismiss or for summary judgment if the requirements of Rule 12(b) 
or Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil procedure are met by the 
moving party, 
Utah Code Ann. $ 63-46b-16: 
§ 63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting 
from formal adjudicative proceedings.... 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the 
agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review 
has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
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(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency 
action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by 
any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring 
resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or 
decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed 
procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally 
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to 
disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, 
made or implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency 
justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that 
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is an appeal from a final decision of the Board of Trustees of the School 
and Institutional Trust Lands Administration (the "SITLA Board") in a formal 
adjudicative proceeding. The SITLA Board's decision in turn arose from the Utah 
Supreme Court's remand in National Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of 
State Lands, 869 P. 2d 909 (Utah 1993) ("NPCA"). In that case, the Supreme Court 
addressed various environmental objections to a 1987 land exchange between the State of 
Utah and Garfield County involving a section of state school trust land located along the 
Burr Trail within the boundaries of Capitol Reef National Park. The Division of State 
Lands and Forestry (the "Division"), which at that time managed the State's school trust 
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lands, had approved the exchange of the school trust section - designated as section 16 -
for lands owned by Garfield County outside the park. 
The National Parks and Conservation Association ("NPCA") sought to intervene 
in the Division's proceedings in order to challenge the exchange, and asked the Division 
to issue several declaratory rulings pertinent to the exchange. The Division denied 
intervention, answered several of the requests for declaratory rulings favorably to the 
Division, and declined NPCA's other requests. The exchange was then consummated, 
and section 16 was conveyed to Garfield County on December 24, 1987. NPCA then 
filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court challenging the Division's actions in 
approving the exchange. On June 24, 1993, the Supreme Court issued its decision in the 
NPCA appeal in NPCA, supra. The Court held that NPCA had standing to challenge the 
Division's actions on the basis of the great public importance of the questions raised, but 
upheld the Division's denial of intervention in the exchange proceedings except as to the 
limited issue of whether the appraisals supporting the exchange ensured that the school 
trust received full value for its lands. 
In addressing NPCA's request for declaratory rulings, the Supreme Court upheld 
the Division's determinations with respect to the scope and nature of the school trust. 
However, the Court determined that the Division had improperly relied on appraisals 
obtained by Garfield County for the exchange lands, rather than commissioning its own 
independent appraisals. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Division for an 
independent determination that the value of the land exchanged for section 16 was 
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adequate under its trust obligations. Rehearing in the case was denied on March 26, 
1994. 
The Division never made the determination required by the remand. The 1994 
Utah legislature terminated the Division's existence effective July 1, 1994, and 
transferred responsibility for management of state school and institutional trust lands to a 
new state agency, the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration ("SITLA"), 
pursuant to Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Management Act. In 2005, SITLA 
received third party requests to purchase portions of the lands acquired from Garfield 
County in the exchange. SITLA determined at that time that the Division had not 
completed the valuation review directed by the Supreme Court on remand. 
In order to comply with the Supreme Court's direction, SITLA retained an 
independent appraiser, Stanford McConkie, MAI, to obtain an opinion of fair market 
value for the lands involved in the 1987 exchange. This appraisal (the "McConkie 
Appraisal") was completed on August 25, 2005. It concluded that the current fair market 
value of the county lands given in 1987 exceeded the present fair market value of section 
16 by more than 300 percent. The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, which is not a 
party to this action, retained another appraisal firm to review the McConkie Appraisal. 
This appraisal review, conducted by J. Philip Cook and Virginia Hylton (the "Cook 
Review") looked only at section 16, and did not review the county lands. It concluded 
that the McConkie Appraisal of section 16 complied with the Appraisal Foundation's 
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice ("USPAP") and with the Appraisal 
Institute's Code of Professional Ethics and Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. 
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However, the Cook Review expressed a different opinion of highest and best use and 
estimated time to market that would tend to lead to a higher value for section 16. The 
Cook Review did not express an opinion of what that value would be. 
On September 15, 2006, SITLA issued a final agency decision approving the 
valuation of the exchange parcels for purposes of the Supreme Court's remand in the 
NPCA litigation, based on the McConkie appraisal's determination that the present fair 
market value of the county lands received in the exchange exceeded that of section 16 by 
more than three to one. NPCA and one of its members timely appealed this decision to 
the SITLA Board pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 53C-1-304 and Utah Administrative 
Code R850-8-1000. The SITLA Board elected to hear the case as a formal adjudicative 
proceeding pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R850-8-1300. By order dated 
September 15, 2007, the SITLA Board granted summary judgment to SITLA, and 
dismissed NPCA's petition. NPCA then filed this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The 1987 Exchange 
1. This adjudication arises from a 1987 land exchange between the State of 
Utah, acting through the Division of State Lands & Forestry (the "Division") and 
Garfield County. The facts of that exchange are set forth in the opinion of the Supreme 
Court in National Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of State Lands, 869 P. 2d 
909 (Utah 1993) ("NPCA"), and are incorporated by reference. 
2. The land that is the subject of this dispute is a 640-acre section of former 
state school trust land that is located within the boundaries of Capitol Reef National Park 
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in Garfield County, and is legally described as section 16, Township 34 South, Range 8 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian ("section 16"). Section 16 is traversed by a county 
road known as the Burr Trail, which has been the subject of substantial environmental 
controversy. NPCA, 869 P.2d at 911. 
3. In 1987, Garfield County sought to acquire the Subject Property from the 
State in exchange for several parcels of land owned by the County elsewhere in the 
County, and in the Richfield City Industrial Park in Sevier County. Record of Appeal 
("R.") 22-23. 
4. NPCA sought to intervene in the land exchange proceedings by petition to 
the Division dated October 14, 1987. This petition was denied by the Division on 
November 16, 1987. NPCA, 869 P.2d at 912. 
5. NPCA also filed requests for declaratory rulings from the Division with 
respect to the proposed land exchange under a now-repealed statute requiring 
administrative agencies to hear petitions for declaratory rulings, Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46a-15 (repealed effective April 25, 1988). On December 21, 1987, the Division denied 
certain of NPCA's requests, and refused to respond to others. Id. 
6. On December 24, 1987, Governor Norman Bangerter consummated the 
land exchange by executing a patent conveying the Subject Property to Garfield County. 
Id. 
7. NPCA subsequently filed a writ of review with the Utah Supreme Court 
challenging the Division's actions in approving the exchange, and the Division's denial 
of its petitions for declaratory rulings. Id. 
10 
The Supreme Court Litigation 
8. In its June 24, 1993 opinion, the Utah Supreme Court determined that 
NPCA had standing to challenge the Division's actions with respect to the exchange. Id. 
The Court then denied NPCA's petition to intervene in the land exchange transaction, on 
the basis that there was no statutory authorization for third-party intervention in the 
state's determination to dispose of real property. Id. at 914-5. 
9. The Supreme Court also addressed NPCA's requests for declaratory 
rulings, which had been denied or not considered by the Division. The Court upheld the 
Division's determinations with respect to the scope and nature of its trust responsibilities 
concerning school trust lands. However, the Court determined that the Division had 
improperly relied on land appraisals submitted by Garfield County for the lands to be 
exchanged, rather than commissioning its own independent appraisals. The Court found 
that the Division's fiduciary responsibilities to the school trust required it to obtain 
independent appraisals of trust assets before conveying such lands, and that failure to do 
so breached the Division's trust duties. Id. at 922. 
10. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Division for a determination 
of whether the appraised values of the Subject Property and the lands offered by Garfield 
County represented the full value of those lands. Id. at 923. 
The Current Valuation Dispute 
11. The Supreme Court denied rehearing in the case on March 26, 1994. On 
July 1, 1994, the Division of State Lands & Forestry went out of existence, the legislature 
having transferred responsibility for management of the state's school and institutional 
11 
trust lands to the newly-created School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration 
pursuant to the Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Management Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 53C-1-101 etseq (2006). 
12. After receiving a third-party request in 2005 to purchase certain of the 
exchange lands, SITLA determined that the Division had not completed the review of 
appraised values directed by the Supreme Court prior to going out of existence. R. 22-23. 
In order to comply with the Supreme Court's direction, SITLA retained an independent 
appraisal firm, Morley & McConkie, L.C., to review valuation of the lands. R. 23. 
13. On August 25, 2005, Stanford S. McConkie, MAI of Morley & McConkie, 
L.C. submitted a review of valuation of the exchange lands entitled "Limited Restricted 
Use Report: Appraisal of Three Parcels of Land Located in Garfield County and Two 
Industrial Lots Located in Richfield Sevier County Utah" (the "McConkie Appraisal"). 
R. 141-160. SITLA obtained a Restricted Use appraisal rather than a full narrative 
appraisal in accordance with its normal policies, and because such a report was less 
expensive than a full report. R. 407. 
14. The McConkie Appraisal concluded that Section 16 was currently worth 
$200,000, while the County exchange lands were currently worth $661,200. R 155. 
NPCA disputed the adequacy and accuracy of the McConkie Appraisal. R. 1-6. 
15. On August 29, 2006, NPCA submitted to SITLA a review of the McConkie 
Appraisal prepared for the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, which was not a party to 
this proceeding, by J. Philip Cook, MAI and Virginia H. Hylton, Appraiser (the "Cook 
Review") which evaluated the McConkie Appraisal's compliance with the Appraisal 
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Foundation's Uniform Standards for Professional Appraisal Practice ("USPAP") and 
with the Appraisal Institute's Code of Professional Ethics and Standards of Professional 
Appraisal Practice. R. 1-15. The Cook Review involved only section 16, not the county 
lands. R. 8. It was a desk review and did not involve a visit to section 16 or any of the 
comparable properties identified in the McConkie Appraisal. R. 8. 
16. The Cook Review found that the McConkie Appraisal complied with 
USPAP standards for a Restricted Use Appraisal Report and the Appraisal Institute's 
Code of Professional Ethics and Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. R. 10. The 
Cook Appraisal Review disagreed with Mr. McConkie's opinion of the highest and best 
use of Section 16, and of the estimated time to market utilized by Mr. McConkie. R. 11. 
The Cook Review opined that the highest and best use of Section 16 was as a secluded 
single user vacation retreat, rather than 40 acre lots as concluded by Mr. McConkie, and 
that this could result in a higher present value than concluded by Mr. McConkie. R. 10-
11. 
17. On September 25, 2006, SITLA's Director took formal action and 
determined that, based upon the McConkie Appraisal and SITLA's staff review and 
concurrence, that the school trust had obtained full value in the exchange, for purposes of 
compliance with the Supreme Court's remand in the NPCA litigation. R. 21-23. 
18. NPCA and an NPCA member, William Wolverton (collectively "NPCA" 
unless specifically distinguished) timely filed their appeal with the SITLA Board of the 
Director's decision to approve the exchange valuations on September 29, 2006 in 
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accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 53C-1-304(2) and Utah Administrative Code R850-8-
1000(2006). R. 28-43. 
The Rulemaking Appeal 
19. On September 19, 2006, NPCA submitted a Petition for Rulemaking to 
SITLA pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12 and Utah Administrative Code R. 15-2 
(2006). R. 24-27. 
20. The NPCA Petition for Rulemaking was based upon the Supreme Court's 
dictum in NPCA that the State had an obligation to protect certain trust lands with unique 
scenic, paleontological, and archaeological values from exploitation. NPCA, 869 P. 2d at 
920-1. R. 24-27. 
21. NPCA's Petition for Rulemaking requested that SITLA enact a rule that 
would: (1) require SITLA to take all feasible action to protect trust lands with "unique 
scenic, archaeological, and paleontological sites" or other noneconomic values and 
provide for disposition alternatives that will protect those values while realizing fair 
economic value to the school trust, including at a minimum all trust lands within National 
and State Parks, National Monuments, National Wildlife Refuges, and river corridors 
nominated for Wild and Scenic River status; (2) require SITLA, in consultation with the 
Governor, to take all feasible steps to have the state or federal government acquire the 
lands for protection by purchase or exchange, at fair appraised value; and (3) when 
appraising lands for conservation transactions, take into account all values accruing to the 
State of Utah or the public schools generally accruing from recreation, tourism and 
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educational values of protecting the lands, and ecosystem services attributable to 
retention and preservation of the land. R. 26-27. 
22. On October 5, 20065 SITLA denied NPCA's request for rulemaking on the 
grounds that it misstated the NPCA decision and would unduly limit SITLA's statutory 
discretion in managing trust lands. R. 61-63. NPCA timely appealed the denial by letter 
dated October 18, 2006. R. 66-75. 
23. On October 19, 2006, the SITLA Board conducted an initial hearing in both 
adjudications pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R850-8-1000(6), appointed a hearing 
examiner, and determined that it would conduct the adjudication of the two appeals on a 
consolidated basis as a formal adjudicative proceeding pursuant to Utah Administrative 
CodeR850-8-1300. R. 78-79. 
24. On December 13, 2006, the Board granted Garfield County the limited 
right to intervene in the adjudication to defend its interests with respect to the valuation 
and conveyance of the lands involved in the 1987 exchange. R. 223-226. 
The SITLA Board's Final Order 
25. SITLA subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss both NPCA's appeal of the 
exchange valuations and the rulemaking appeal. The hearing examiner appointed by the 
SITLA Board heard oral arguments on the motion on March 14, 2007. R. 380-422. 
26. The hearing examiner issued a proposed order in the two proceedings on 
July 5, 2007. R. 422-445. The proposed order granted SITLA's Motion to Dismiss 
NPCA's appeal with respect to the 1987 exchange. The proposed order also severed the 
rulemaking appeal from the appeal of the 1987 exchange, and took NPCA's petition 
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under advisement pending study by SITLA of issues raised by the request for rulemaking. 
Id. NPCA concurred in the severance of the exchange appeal from the rulemaking 
petition. R. 446. 
27. On September 13, 2007, the full SITLA Board unanimously adopted the 
proposed order dismissing NPCA's appeal of the exchange issues and severing the 
rulemaking proceeding. R. 516-539. NPCA then filed this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. NPCA's Claims of Unfairness to Garfield County Were Correctly Dismissed by 
the SITLA Board as Beyond the Scope of the Supreme Court's Remand. 
The SITLA Board correctly determined that it did not have jurisdiction to grant 
the relief sought by NPCA - an unwinding of the 1987 exchange on the basis of 
inadequate compensation to Garfield County. In its original decision in the NPCA 
litigation, the Supreme Court exhaustively addressed multiple challenges to the 1987 
exchange, and dismissed all but one - the legality of the Division's use of appraisals 
commissioned by Garfield County. Its remand to the school trust was limited to the 
single issue of whether land values were fair to the school trust when considered by an 
independent appraiser. NPCA took the exact opposite position in this appeal. NPCA 
asked SITLA to set the exchange aside based on purported unfairness to Garfield County, 
since the new appraisal revealed that the lands acquired by the school trust had 
appreciated faster in the intervening years than the Burr Trail property acquired by the 
County. NPCA's request was far beyond the scope of the Supreme Court's remand. The 
SITLA Board concluded that there was no statutory basis for it - as an administrative 
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board with limited powers - to invalidate or refuse to recognize a twenty year old 
conveyance on grounds not addressed in the Supreme Court's remand. It also correctly 
found that the imbalance in values in favor of the school trust was recognized in the 
original NPCA opinion, and that NPCA's attempt to raise it as a new issue was barred by 
res judicata because NPCA could have raised the purported unfairness to the County in 
the original case, or in the courts. The SITLA Board's decision not to consider NPCA's 
claims was correct as a matter of law, and should be upheld by the Supreme Court. 
2. NPCA Did Not Have a Right to Intervene or Standing on the Valuation Issue. 
The SITLA Board also correctly concluded that NPCA had no right to intervene to 
raise the issue of the alleged inadequacy of the McConkie Appraisal, and had no standing 
before the SITLA Board on the appraisal issue. In the original NPCA litigation, the 
Supreme Court upheld the Division's denial of NPCA's blanket request to intervene in 
the Division's consideration of the Garfield County exchange proposal because there was 
no statutory basis for intervention, and because as a matter of policy the State's land 
disposal decisions are executive and not subject to third party interference at the 
administrative level. This holding remains valid on remand. As to standing, in the 
original NPCA case, the Supreme Court found standing in order to resolve issues of great 
public importance with respect to overall the legal parameters governing Utah's 
obligations under the school trust. On remand, those issues are no longer present, and 
NPCA does not meet otherwise applicable tests for standing, such as injury-in-fact, 
causal relation between injuries alleged and the challenged action, and redressability. 
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The Supreme Court and other courts addressing the standing of third parties to challenge 
agency decisions involving school trust lands have also denied standing, where, as here, 
interests are being asserted by a third party adversely to the interests of the school trust. 
3. The McConkie Appraisal Was Adequate as a Matter of Law. 
Even were the SITLA Board to have jurisdiction to review NPCA's claims here, 
the McConkie Appraisal is adequate as a matter of law to fulfill the Supreme Court's 
mandate that the Division determine that land values were "adequate under its trust 
obligations." The Supreme Court's holding in NPCA concerned the necessity of an 
independent review, in place of a county-commissioned appraisal that could be subject to 
improper influence. The McConkie Appraisal is undisputedly independent. Use of a 
restricted use appraisal report was legally sufficient and within SITLA's discretion. The 
fact that NPCA disagrees with some of its conclusions is legally irrelevant; the Cook 
review appraisal relied upon by NPCA confirmed that the McConkie Appraisal was 
compliant with USPAP. Finally, NPCA's claims that the McConkie Appraisal 
overvalued section 16 support the conclusion that the school trust benefitted from the 
exchange - exactly what the Supreme Court directed the Division to determine. 
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ARGUMENT 
L 
THE SITLA BOARD PROPERLY DECLINED TO 
CONSIDER NPCA'S CLAIMS THAT GARFIELD 
COUNTY RECEIVED INADEQUATE 
COMPENSATION IN THE 1987 EXCHANGE 
A. The NPCA Court's Holding Was Based Solely on the State's Obligation to the 
School Trust. 
Aside from issues of standing, the Supreme Court's decision in NPCA hinged 
upon the scope and nature of Utah's school trust. The Court held that the Enabling Act 
land grants imposed an express trust on the state in administering school trust lands, and 
rejected NPCA's arguments that this trust was in the nature of the public trust applicable 
to sovereign lands. 869 P.2d at 918-9. In furtherance of the school trust, the Court held 
that the State has an obligation to maximize monetary returns from school trust lands. Id. 
at 920. Based upon its trust findings, the Court then took up NPCA's contention that the 
Division's practice of relying on appraisals submitted by exchange applicants was in 
conflict with its trust obligations. Id. at 921. 
Prior to the 1987 exchange, Garfield County had retained an appraiser acceptable 
to the Division to value the exchange properties. That appraiser determined that as of 
May 15, 1987, section 16 was worth $65,000, while an initial package of county-owned 
lands was appraised at $66,000. This equal value exchange was not acceptable to the 
Board of State Lands & Forestry, which required county lands appraised at an additional 
$35,000 to be added to the package. Id. This resulted in the county-offered lands being 
appraised at 150% of section 16. Id. at 912, 921. 
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The Supreme Court found that these appraisals were unacceptable because they 
had been submitted by Garfield County. The Court stated that an appraisal submitted by 
a party intending to purchase a trust asset is suspect on its face, because the buyer has the 
opportunity to shop for favorable appraisals, a per se breach of trust. Id. at 921. The 
Court held: 
To comply with its fiduciary duties, the Division itself must obtain the 
appraisals on which it bases its decision. The Division relied solely on the 
appraisals submitted by Garfield County in ascertaining the fair market 
value of both section 16 and the County's land. Given the procedure 
employed by the Division, the appraisals submitted by Garfield County 
may not accurately reflect the fair market value of the parcels, even though 
the appraised value of the County land offered appeared to be well in 
excess of section 16's value. Accordingly we hold that the Division 
breached its trust duty by not securing appraisals for both section 16 and 
Garfield County from appraisers either retained or employed by the 
Division. 
Id. at 922 (emphasis added). 
Because of its emphasis on the trust law aspects of the case, the Supreme Court's 
remand to the Division was limited and specific: the Division was to determine whether 
"the value of the land exchanged for section 16 is adequate under its trust obligations." 
Id. at 923. 
B. NPCA's Claims of Unfairness to Garfield County Are Beyond the Scope of the 
Supreme Court's Remand to the Division, and Beyond the SITLA Board's 
Jurisdiction. 
NPCA's arguments in this proceeding stand the Supreme Court's decision in the 
earlier NPCA litigation on its head. While NPCA focused on the Division's duty to 
ensure the fairness of the proposed exchange to the school trust, NPCA asked the SITLA 
Board set aside the 1987 exchange on the basis of unfairness to Garfield County twenty 
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years later. NPCA's claim in this regard is beyond the scope of the Supreme Court's 
remand, and the SITLA Board properly decided to dismiss it. 
After SITLA determined in 2005 that the re-appraisal required by the NPCA 
remand had not been completed by the Division before it went out of existence, SITLA 
retained an independent appraiser, Stanford McConkie, MAI, to conduct the required 
determination that the school trust had received full value in the exchange. The resulting 
McConkie Appraisal found that the lands that the school trust obtained from Garfield 
County in the 1989 exchange had actually increased in value proportionately more than 
Section 16. At the time of the original exchange, the county lands were valued at 
$98,500, while Section 16 was valued at $65,000, a valuation ratio of 151.5 per cent in 
favor of the school trust. The McConkie Appraisal found that by 2005, the value of the 
former county lands had increased to $661,200, while Section 16 had increased in value 
to $200,000, resulting in an increased valuation ratio of 330.5%. R. at 155. 
NPCA argues that the SITLA Board should have voided the exchange between 
Garfield County and the Division because Utah law required the County to obtain 
adequate compensation in exchange for the county lands, and the 330.5% current 
valuation ratio indicates that the County did not receive adequate compensation. NPCA 
Brief at 37-38. NPCA is correct that as a general matter, local governments may not 
dispose of real property without adequate compensation. Municipal Building Authority of 
Iron County v. Lowder, 111 P.2d 273, 282-3 (Utah 1985); Sears v. Ogden City, 533 P.2d 
118, 119 (Utah 1975). However, the SITLA Board was not empowered to address this 
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issue de novo on remand from the Supreme Court, nor did it have jurisdiction to grant the 
relief requested by NPCA. 
On remand, a lower court has the obligation to implement both the letter and the 
spirit of the mandate from the appellate court, taking into account the appellate court's 
opinion and the circumstances it embraces. Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P. 2d 
1034, 1038 (Utah 1995). This rule is a subset of the "law of the case" doctrine, under 
which a decision made on an issue during one stage of the case is binding in successive 
stages of the litigation. Id. at 1037. Here, the letter and the spirit of the Supreme Court's 
decision in NPCA was the need to determine whether the school trust, not the County, 
had received adequate compensation. The Supreme Court clearly was aware that the 
proposed exchange could result in an imbalance in value against the County; it twice 
specifically mentioned the 1.5 to one value ratio under the appraisals before it. 869 P. 2d 
at 912, 921. SITLA, and the SITLA Board, correctly stayed within the Supreme Court's 
mandate by dismissing claims unrelated to whether the school trust had received full 
value. 
The SITLA Board also correctly recognized that it did not have jurisdiction to 
grant the relief requested by NPCA with respect to the County fairness issue. NPCA's 
petition for administrative review asked that the SITLA Board unilaterally determine that 
the 1987 exchange was void and unlawful because Garfield County breached its duty to 
obtain adequate compensation. R.33. Aside from being beyond the scope of the NPCA 
mandate, NPCA's contentions would also require the Board to act beyond its jurisdiction. 
In its statutory capacity as an adjudicative body, the SITLA Board's jurisdiction is 
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limited to the powers expressly granted to it by the Utah legislature. Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Ass 'n v. Bagley & Company, 901 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1995), on remand 928 
P.2d 1047 (Utah 1996), cert den. 937 P.2d 136 (Utah 1997); Bevans v. Industrial 
Comm }n of Utah, 790 P.2d 573, 576 (Utah App. 1990). The SITLA Board found no 
legislative grant of authority to it to adjudicate whether Garfield County had exceeded its 
powers by conveying lands for purportedly inadequate consideration. Indeed, were it to 
declare the 1987 exchange void on the basis that Garfield County had exceeded its 
powers, it would deservedly invite a quick lawsuit from the County on the basis of the 
Board's own limited jurisdiction. Title to Section 16 has been in Garfield County for 
more than 20 years. Neither SITLA nor the Board has any legislatively-granted power to 
unilaterally adjudicate that a prior conveyance by the State was invalid because of the 
grantee's lack of authority.1 As the Supreme Court recognized in NPCA, the appropriate 
forum for a claim that an administrative agency has acted illegally in disposing of land is 
an action for an injunction in the district court, where a factual record can be developed 
and the legality of the administrative action tested. 869 P.2d at 914. The SITLA Board 
correctly decided that the question of whether Garfield County acted legally was properly 
left to the courts, not an administrative board. 
1
 Tacitly acknowledging that the SITLA Board has no authority to void the 1987 
exchange as NPCA originally requested, NPCA argues in the alternative that SITLA 
should have pursued legal action to reverse the exchange, so that it could then sell section 
16 for less money to some unnamed conservation entity. NPCA Brief at 42-43. As well 
as being contrary to the limited scope of the remand, this course of action would be 
directly contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in NPCA that the Division had duly 
considered and properly rejected giving priority to conservation values over economics 
when approving the 1987 exchange. 869 P.2d at 921; see also Section III.C, infra. 
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C. The Issue of Inadequate Compensation to Garfield County Could Have Been 
Litigated in NPCA, and Res Judicata Bars the Issue from being Considered 
Anew. 
Under the "claim preclusion" branch of the doctrine of res judicata, a party may 
not relitigate a claim for relief finally resolved by a judgment on the merits. Penrod v. 
Nu Creation Cream, 669 P.2d 873, 874-75 (Utah 1983). The same rule also prevents 
relitigation of claims that could have been litigated in the prior action but were not. Id. 
The Supreme Court in NPCA twice mentioned that the original appraisals established that 
the County was giving up lands appraised at more than 150% of section 16. 869 P. 2d at 
912, 921. The SITLA Board found that the issue of inadequate consideration to Garfield 
County could have been litigated by NPCA because, based on the facts stated by the 
NPCA court, it was acknowledged that Garfield County was giving up lands worth 
considerably more than section 16. R. 527. It therefore held that res judicata provided 
an additional basis for denying NPCA's valuation claims. Id. 
NPCA cites Macris & Associates v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 23, 16 P.3d 1214 
(Utah 2000), for the proposition that for res judicata purposes a plaintiff need only 
include claims in a prior suit if the plaintiff was aware of the facts upon which the later 
claims were based at the time the first suit was filed. NPCA Brief at 41. NPCA argues 
that since the original appraisals were held invalid by the Supreme Court, and the 
McConkie Appraisal did not exist as of the original litigation, it was could not have 
"ascertained the unlawful disparity or presented that claim" in the earlier litigation. Id. 
In Macris, the defendant in a contract action transferred all of its assets to a new 
corporation three days before trial. When the plaintiff sued the new corporation under 
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the Utah fraudulent transfer statute, the corporation claimed that the fraudulent 
conveyance claims should have been raised in the prior action. The Supreme Court 
disagreed, finding that the new action rested on a different set of facts - the fraudulent 
transfer rather than the original contract - and so was not subject to res judicata. 2000 
UT 23, ffif 29-31, 16 P. 3d at 1221. 
The Maoris decision is easily distinguished from the current case. The original 
appraisals that established the basis for the exchange agreement were premised on the 
County giving up more than it was getting. This fact was present in the original 
litigation. The Supreme Court's ruling that counterparty appraisals could not be relied on 
by the Division did not change the fact of an agreement for an imbalanced exchange of 
values. Unlike Maoris, the facts upon which NPCA now seeks relief- an imbalance in 
favor of the school trust - were known by the parties and considered by the Supreme 
Court in the original litigation. That NPCA chose to assert the opposite argument in that 
case does not matter now. The SITLA Board was correct in finding the inadequate 
County compensation claims barred by res judicata. 
II. 
NPCA HAD NO STANDING OR RIGHT 
TO INTERVENE TO CHALLENGE THE 
VALUATION OF THE EXCHANGE 
LANDS 
A. Unlike the Original NPCA Litigation, Issues of Great Public Importance Are 
Not Present at the Current Time. 
In the original NPCA litigation, the Supreme Court did not find that NPCA met the 
traditional requirements for standing. Instead, it allowed the litigation to proceed under 
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the alternative test that allows standing where issues of significant public importance are 
raised by an appropriate party. See Terracor v. Utah Bd. Of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796, 
799 (Utah 1986); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983). The Court's 
finding of standing was based upon the need to resolve a significant policy issue: the 
overall scope and nature of the state's school trust obligation, and particularly whether 
the state had an obligation to give priority to unique nonmonetary values associated with 
some school trust lands. 869 P.2d at 913-4. The Supreme Court defined "the issue that is 
of great importance to this state" as follows: 
The Division should recognize that some school lands have unique scenic, 
paleontological, and archaeological values that would have little economic 
value on the open market. In some cases, it would be unconscionable not to 
preserve and protect those values.... [W]hen economic exploitation of such 
lands is not compatible with the noneconomic values, the state may have to 
consider exchanging public trust lands or other state lands for school lands. 
Indeed, it might be necessary for the state to buy or lease the school lands 
from the trust so that unique noneconomic values can be preserved and 
protected, and the full economic value of the school trust lands still 
realized. 
Id. at 921. NPCA now argues that this language obligated the SITLA Board in 2005 to 
disregard the favorable economic aspects of the 1987 exchange, and void the exchange in 
favor of some unspecified transaction with a conservation entity. NPCA Brief at 42-43. 
NPCA completely misconstrues the NPCA opinion as it relates to the current situation. 
The Supreme Court stated that "in some cases" the state may have the obligation to 
protect unique noneconomic values on trust lands by considering exchange or protective 
purchase of the lands. 869 P. 2d at 921. However, it found that in this case the Division 
had in fact adequately considered aesthetic and recreational values in deciding to 
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exchange Section 16. Id. It further found that the Board of State Lands & Forestry had 
acted correctly in refusing to give priority to the scenic, aesthetic, and recreational values 
of section 16 over economic values when it approved the exchange. Id. The NPCA 
court's statement on unique lands is therefore not relevant here. 
The Supreme Court fully resolved the policy issues before it, setting forth the 
nature and scope of the school trust, and finding that the Board of State Lands had in fact 
appropriately given priority to economic factors over the scenic, aesthetic, and 
recreational values of section 16 when deciding to approve the exchange. Id. at 921. It 
also considered the policy issue of how to ensure fair market value to the school trust 
when disposing of lands, which it resolved by requiring independent appraisals. Id. at 
921-22. 
No such significant policy issues are present on remand. NPCA disagrees with the 
results and methodology of the McConkie Appraisal, and concludes that it understated 
how favorable the 1987 exchange was to the school trust. NPCA's proposed remedy is 
that the SITLA Board set aside an exchange that is undisputedly favorable to the school 
2
 In the 15 years since NPCA, many of the issues of concern to the Supreme Court have 
been addressed by legislative action at the state or federal level. The Utah legislature has 
enacted comprehensive legislation protecting archaeological and paleontological 
resources on state trust lands. See Utah Code Ann. § 9-8-301 (2005); Utah Code Ann. § 
63-73-11 (1995). All school trust lands inside national parks, recreation areas and 
monuments, and most inside national forests, have been exchanged to the federal 
government to be held for preservation. Utah Schools and Lands Exchange Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. 105-335, 112 Stat. 3139. Similar land exchanges have been completed or are 
ongoing for trust lands located within proposed wilderness areas. SITLA is also 
undertaking a review of the agency's policy with respect to other sensitive lands, as set 
forth in the SITLA Board's order severing the rulemaking appeal from the current action. 
R. 534-536. 
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trust, and accept a lesser value from some future transaction with a conservation entity. 
NPCA Brief at 42. NPCA's claims are in no way related to the "issues of significant 
public importance" that were the basis of standing in the original NPCA litigation. There 
is therefore no basis for standing under the "alternative test." Standing may be raised at 
any stage of the proceeding. Terracor, 716 P.2d at 798; see also Gollust v. Mendell, 501 
U.S. 115, 126, H I S . Ct. 2173, 2180, 115 L.Ed. 2d 109 (199 l)(plaintiff must maintain 
standing throughout the course of litigation). The SITLA Board correctly concluded that 
NPCA did not have standing to challenge the McConkie Appraisal in the current remand 
proceeding because the important policy issues that allowed standing in the prior 
proceeding were no longer present. 
B. NPCA and William Wolverton Do Not Meet the Traditional Test for Standing. 
In Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board, 2006 UT 74, 148 
P.3d 960 (Utah 2006), the Supreme Court described how courts should determine 
whether a plaintiff has standing in an environmental case. The "traditional" test for 
standing requires a three part inquiry: (a) will the party be adversely affected by the 
challenged actions? (b) is there a causal relation between the alleged injury, the 
challenged action, and the relief requested? (c) will the relief requested be substantially 
likely to redress the injury claimed? Id. at j^ 19. 
Counsel for NPCA and its co-petitioner, an NPCA member and Garfield County 
resident named William Wolverton, set forth their reasons for claiming standing in their 
original appeal document submitted to the SITLA Board. See R. at 31-32. No affidavits 
from either NPCA or Mr. Wolverton appear in the record. Counsel for NPCA claimed 
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that SITLA's adoption of the McConkie Appraisal deprived NPCA of an interest in a 
proper appraisal of section 16 granted by the NPCA Court, and would injure it by 
validating the 1987 exchange, allowing Garfield County to develop the section. R. at 32. 
On behalf of Mr. Wolverton, counsel contended that, as a county taxpayer, he was 
harmed by Garfield County's 1987 disposition of section 16 for less than adequate 
compensation, and indicated his belief that future development of the property would 
impair his enjoyment of the area. R. 32. 
As an initial matter, NPCA and Mr. Wolverton have not met their burden of 
establishing that they would be adversely affected by the challenged actions. Under 
Sierra Club, supra, NPCA must establish associational standing by establishing that its 
individual members have standing. 2006 UT 74, \ 21, 148 P.3d at 967-8. Its standing 
thus rises or falls on the standing of Mr. Wolverton. Mr. Wolverton did not file any 
affidavit to support his claims. Assuming arguendo that statements of counsel as to his 
allegations were sufficient, his stated belief that ownership and development of section 
16 by Garfield County would impair the quality of his future experiences of that area 
does not meet the standard set by Sierra Club, which required a showing of "actual or 
imminent injury" to recreational use through "description of concrete plans" to use the 
area in the future. 2006 UT 74, p o , 148 P.3d at 970-1. 
Another fatal flaw to NPCA/Wolverton's standing is that they cannot show the 
second and third elements of traditional standing, causation and redressability. SITLA's 
determination that the 1987 exchange was fair to the school trust will in itself have no 
direct effect on the land, NPCA, or Wolverton; any causal link between the SITLA action 
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and some harm to them is speculative and second-order at best. In order for 
redressability to exist, the administrative agency must have the power to redress the 
affiants' injuries. 2006 UT 74, |33 , 148 P.3d at 972. As discussed in Section I above, 
the SITLA Board was limited in the relief that it could grant both by the scope of the 
NPCA remand and its statutory authority. The SITLA Board could not legally set aside 
the 1987 exchange on the basis of inadequate compensation to Garfield County, because 
doing so would be beyond the mandate and its statutory authority. Since the SITLA 
Board could not grant the relief requested, the claimed injury is not redressable, so 
NPCA/Wolverton lack standing. 
C. NPCA May Not Intervene to Assert Interests Adverse to the School Trust. 
In the earlier litigation, NPCA had sought to intervene in the Division's 
consideration of the exchange. The Supreme Court held that NPCA was not entitled to 
intervene at the agency level to challenge the Division's executive determination to 
convey lands. 869 P. 2d 914. The Court articulated the sound policy for denying third 
party intervention into executive real property decisions: 
The reason for allowing the state to deal with leasing, selling, and 
exchanging property as an executive decision is not difficult to ascertain. 
The state, through its various agencies, engages in innumerable transactions 
for the purchase, sale, exchange, and lease of real and personal property. If 
these transactions were subject to the delay inherent in adjudicative 
proceedings at the demand of a third party asserting a private interest, 
government programs dealing with the acquisition and disposition of 
property could be paralyzed. See Terracor v. Utah Bd. Of State Lands, 716 
P. 2d 796 (Utah 1986). 
Id. The Court stated that the appropriate method of challenging a purportedly illegal 
conveyance would be through an action for injunctive relief in the district court, where a 
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factual record could be developed and the legality of the agency action tested against 
governing law. Id. However, the Court then carved out a narrow exception to its 
holding, finding that NPCA had a "limited" right of intervention on the appraisal issue. 
Id. at 922, n. 11. This finding was premised solely on the need to protect the interests of 
the school trust from improper administration. 
On remand, NPCA has made a complete U-turn in its position and abandoned any 
pretense that its interests are congruent with the school trust. It now contends that the 
McConkie Appraisal overvalued section 16, and that Garfield County therefore received 
inadequate compensation in the exchange. It is not seeking to protect the school trust, but 
rather to force the unwinding of a profitable transaction so that the school trust can sell 
section 16 to a conservation group on less favorable terms. See NPCA Brief at 42. 
NPCA's reversal destroys any basis for allowing it to intervene in this case. 
In Terracor, supra, the Supreme Court held that an unsuccessful applicant that had 
sought to acquire school trust lands did not have standing to challenge the legality of the 
Board of State Lands' lease of the lands to a third party. 716 P.2d at 800. The Supreme 
Court specifically relied on the absence of a claim that the school trust was being harmed 
in denying standing there. Id. Courts in other school trust land states have gone further, 
flatly holding that third parties seeking to assert the interests of the school trust in 
furtherance of their own interests cannot have standing, since the school trust 
beneficiaries and/or attorney general are best situated to assert the interests of the school 
trust. Brotman v. East Lake Creek Ranch LLP, 31 P.3d 886, 894-95 (Colo. 2001); Forest 
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Guardians v. Powell, 24 P.3d 803 (N.M. App. 2001)(conservation groups lack standing 
to assert the interests of trust beneficiaries in challenge to school trust actions). 
NPCA's contradictory position illustrates the Supreme Court's wisdom in 
insulating executive real estate decisions from the adjudicative process. If third parties 
could take issue with multiple aspects of the value of trust lands in every trust lands 
exchange or sale, the school trust would, as the Supreme Court warned, risk paralysis in 
fulfilling its statutory purpose. NPCA/Wolverton do not have standing to assert their 
valuation claims here. 
III. 
THE MCCONKIE APPRAISAL WAS ADEQUATE 
AS A MATTER OF LAW 
A. Introduction. 
NPCA argues that SITLA's use of a restricted appraisal report, instead of a full 
narrative appraisal, did not satisfy the Supreme Court's directive on remand that the 
Division determine whether value of the land exchanged for Section 16 represented full 
and adequate value for the school trust. NPCA Brief at 35. It also argues that the report 
disregarded material factors, including topography, regulatory restraints and lack of 
services in reaching a determination of value, resulting in overstatement of the value of 
section 16. NPCA Brief at 32-33. 
The report relied upon by SITLA was prepared by Stanford S. McConkie, MAI 
and was entitled "Limited Restricted Use Report: Appraisal of Three Parcels of Land 
Located in Garfield County and Two Industrial Lots Located in Richfield Sevier County 
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Utah." R. at 132-160. SITLA determined that a restricted appraisal was less expensive 
than a full narrative appraisal, and that such a report would be adequate for the agency's 
internal review of the valuation of the exchange parcels. R. at 407-8. The McConkie 
Appraisal states that it was intended as a Restricted Use Appraisal Report set forth under 
Standards Rule 2-2(c) of the Uniform Standards for Professional Appraisal Practice 
("USPAP"). 
The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance ("SUWA"), which was not a party to this 
case, obtained a review of the McConkie Appraisal from J. Philip Cook, MAI, which was 
dated July 25, 2006. R. 169-177. SUWA was named as the sole client and intended user 
of the Cook Review, and the purpose of the review was deemed to be for internal 
planning. R. 170. The Cook Review addressed only section 16, and not the county 
properties acquired by the state in the 1987 exchange. The Cook Review was a desk 
review, and Mr. Cook and his associate did not actually visit section 16. R. 170. The 
Cook Review stated that the McConkie Appraisal was compliant in form with USPAP 
and with the Appraisal Institute's Code of Professional Ethics and Standards of 
Professional Appraisal Practice. R. 172. However, Mr. Cook was of the opinion that the 
McConkie report's opinion that the highest and best use of section 16 could be obtained 
by subdividing the property into 40 acre lots was incorrect. Mr. Cook's opinion was that 
the highest and best use of section 16 was to market the property as a single large parcel 
to an out-of-state investor for exclusive vacation use. A corollary of this conclusion was 
that Mr. Cook concluded that Mr. McConkie had overestimated the marketing time for 
the property, which would be less for a single sale than for multiple lots. R. 172. The 
Cook Review did not express any opinion concerning the specific value of section 16. R. 
169-177. 
B. A Restricted Use Appraisal Is Adequate for an Internal Determination of Value. 
The Board correctly concluded that SITLA's use of a restricted use appraisal 
report was sufficient to meet the Supreme Court's mandate. The Supreme Court 
specifically directed the Division to determine independently (i.e. without reliance on 
appraisals by interested parties) whether the 1987 exchange resulted in full value had 
been achieved by the school trust. A restricted use appraisal report is recognized as a 
legal appraisal. In USPAP's discussions of allowable types of appraisals, the Appraisal 
Foundation specifically states: "When the intended users do not include parties other than 
the client, a Restricted Use Appraisal Report may be provided." USPAP Standards Rule 
2-2, Comment, available at http://commerce.appraisalfoundation.org. USPAP Standard 
2-2(c) sets specific standards for this type of appraisal. Id, As a matter of agency 
practice, SITLA obtains restricted use appraisal reports where it already has some 
familiarity with lands, and where the purpose of the appraisal is for internal review. R. 
407. Such appraisals are less expensive than full reports. Id. In this case, utilizing a 
restricted use appraisal report was within the broad discretion granted by the legislature 
to SITLA in the management and disposition of school and institutional trust lands. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 53C-l-302(l)(b)(iv) (SITLA procedures are to be ubroadly construed 
to grant the board, director, and administration full discretionary authority to manage, 
maintain or dispose of trust assets in the manner they consider most favorable to the 
beneficiaries"). 
34 
The fact that the Cook Review disagreed with factual conclusions drawn by Mr. 
McConkie as to highest and best use and time to market is not legally relevant.3 The 
Cook Review stated that the McConkie appraisal was compliant with all requirements of 
USPAP for such an appraisal. Disagreement between appraisers as to elements of 
valuation is neither uncommon nor legally relevant. In the absence of a material breach 
of USPAP, an appraisal of state trust lands is not invalid. Broadhead v. Bonita Lakes 
Mall Ltd, 702 So. 2d 92, 99 (Miss. 1997). NPCA did not identify any such material 
breach with the McConkie Appraisal, and SITLA could reasonably rely on it. Nothing in 
the Cook Report suggests that the overall exchange was unfair to the school trust. Mr. 
Cook did not even review the lands received by the school trust in the 1987 exchange. 
The McConkie appraisal found that these lands had appreciated more than six-fold since 
1987. Because the directive of the Supreme Court in NPCA was for the Division to 
determine for the benefit of itself whether value had been achieved for the school trust, a 
restricted use appraisal (as defined and controlled by USPAP Standard 2, as was the case 
with the McConkie Appraisal), was legally sufficient. Where, as here, an agency has 
been granted explicit or implicit discretion under a statute, the reviewing court should 
grant some deference to the agency's conclusions, and set aside the agency determination 
only if was arbitrary and capricious, or beyond tolerable limits of reason. Sierra Club, 
supra, 2006 UT 74, Tflj 9-10, 148 P. 3d at 965. The decision of SITLA that the values of 
3
 This is true even assuming for the sake of argument that NPCA had not based its entire 
case on a conclusion - that the McConkie Appraisal overvalued section 16 - that 
contradicts Mr. Cook's apparent views. 
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the exchange lands were acceptable was reasonable under the circumstances, and should 
not be disturbed. 
C. NPCA 's Claims that Section 16 Was Overvalued Support the Board's Decision. 
In contrast with the Cook Review, NPCA argues that the McConkie Appraisal of 
section 16 was too high. NPCA asserts that the McConkie Appraisal incorrectly 
disregarded the rugged terrain of section 16 in finding that the land could be sold as 40 
acre lots, disregarded lack of utility access, and did not consider the regulatory impact of 
the parcel's location inside Capitol Reef National Park on the parcels' value. R. at 3-5. 
NPCA therefore argues that the McConkie Appraisal did not comply with USPAP Rule 
1-2, which requires that an appraiser must identify relevant physical, legal and economic 
attributes of the subject property. NPCA Brief at 32-34. 
Because it heard the issues in the context of SITLA's Motion to Dismiss, the 
Board assumed for the purposes of the motion before it that NPCA's factual assertions 
concerning the attributes of section 16 were correct. R. 517; see Mounteer v. Utah Power 
& Light, 823 P. 2d 1055 (Utah 1991). Where, as here, the parties have chosen to submit 
materials outside the pleadings, the Board was permitted to treat SITLA's Motion to 
Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment under U.R.C.P. 56. U.R.C.P. 12(c). The 
Board was required to consider only facts that were not in dispute, Sorenson v. Beers, 585 
P.2d 458 (Utah 1978), and could rule in favor of SITLA only if it appeared as a matter of 
law that NPCA could not prevail. Harvey v. Sanders, 534 P.2d 905 (Utah 1975). 
The SITLA Board's ruling met this standard. Assuming that all of the factual 
arguments raised by NPCA were true - in short that section 16 faced so many constraints 
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that its value was minimal - NPCA was not entitled to relief as a matter of law. The sole 
basis for the remand from NPCA was a determination that the 1987 exchange was fair to 
the school trust. Under NPCA, SITLA had the obligation to maximize benefits to the 
school trust. See also Utah Code Ann. § 53C-l-102(2)(b) (state as trustee must manage 
trust lands in the most prudent and profitable manner possible, and not for purposes 
inconsistent with the best interests of the beneficiaries). If all of NPCA's factual 
contentions are accepted as true, the 1987 exchange was even more clearly in the best 
interests of the school trust, and must be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of the Supreme Court's remand in NPCA was for the Division/SITLA 
to obtain an independent valuation of the exchange lands and determine that the school 
trust beneficiaries had been adequately compensated. NPCA seeks to stand the remand 
on its head by claiming that the SITLA Board should have given preference to the 
interests of Garfield County instead, so that some unspecified conservation entity can 
obtain section 16 at a lower value once the 1987 exchange is unwound. The SITLA 
Board correctly determined that it could consider only the issue remanded to it by the 
Supreme Court - whether the school trust had received full value in the 1987 exchange. 
The SITLA Board found that it had. The Supreme Court should affirm the SITLA 
Board's order. 
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ADDENDUM 
THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
OF THE SCHOOL AND INSTITUTIONAL TRUST LANDS ADMINISTRATION 
In the Consolidated Matter of: 
Appeal from Final Agency Action 
Requested by 
National Parks Conservation Association 
and William Wolverton 
ORDER: (1) SEPARATING 
ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS; (2) 
GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS APPEAL OF AGENCY 
ACTION RE EXCHANGE NO. 188; AND 
(3) CONTINUING CONSIDERATION OF 
REQUEST FOR RULEMAKING 
This Order is adopted by the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration' 
Board of Trustees in the above-entitled formal administrative adjudication.. 
INTRODUCTION 
This adjudicative proceeding involves an appeal by the National Parks and 
Conservation Association ("NPCA") and NPCA member William Wolverton 
(collectively "Petitioners") of final decisions by the Director of the School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Administration ("SITLA") to: (1) approve the valuation of state 
trust lands and non-trust lands involved in State Exchange 188 on remand from the Utah 
Supreme Court in the case of National Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of 
State Lands, 869 P. 2d 909 (Utah 1993); and (2) deny NPCA's Petition for a Rule Change 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12. 
The Board of Trustees for SITLA (the "Board") has jurisdiction to hear 
Petitioners' appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 53C-1-304(2). On October 19, 2006, the 
Board conducted an initial hearing in this adjudication pursuant to Utah Administrative 
Code RS50-8-1000(6), and determined that it would conduct the adjudication of the 
appeals as a formal adjudicative proceeding pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R850-
8-1300. The Board appointed Board member James Leee as hearing examiner to 
conduct all proceedings in the adjudications, pursuant to Utah Administrative Code 
R850-8-1500(2). On November 10, 2006, SITLA moved to dismiss Petitioners' appeal 
both as to State Exchange 188 and as to the denial of the Petition of a Rule Change, for 
failure to state a cause of action. On December 13, 2006, the hearing examiner granted 
Garfield County limited intervenor status solely for purposes of contesting 
NPCA/Wolverton's appeal of SITLA's decision in the Exchange No. 188 matter. After 
briefing by the parties, the hearing examiner heard oral arguments on March 14, 2007. 
The hearing examiner submitted a proposed order in this proceeding for consideration by 
the Board, which order is now adopted by the Board. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Utah Code Ann. § 53C-1-304 authorizes the Board to adjudicate appeals from 
final actions by the Director of SITLA. The Board is required to uphold the final action 
of the Director unless it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency action 
violated applicable law, rules, or Board policy. This matter is before the Board on 
SITLA's Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, pursuant to U.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6). In reviewing a Motion to Dismiss, the Board must construe the pleadings in the 
light most favorable to the Petitioners, and indulge all reasonable inferences in their 
favor. Mounteerv. Utah Power & Light, 823 P. 2d 1055 (Utah 1991). Where, as here, 
the parties have chosen to submit materials outside the pleadings, the Board may treat the 
pending Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment under U.R.C.P. 56. 
U.R.C.P. 12(c). The Board must consider only facts that are not in dispute, Sorenson v. 
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Beers, 585 P.2d 458 (Utah 1978), and may mle in favor of the movant only if it appears 
as a matter of law that the Petitioners cannot prevail. Harvey v. Sanders, 534 P.2d 905 
(Utah 1975). 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Board finds that the following facts are undisputed, based upon the materials 
submitted by the parties or officially noted by the Board: 
State Exchange No. 188 
1. This adjudication arises from a 1987 land exchange between the State of Utah, 
acting through the Division of State Lands & Forestry (the "Division") and Garfield 
County. The facts of that exchange are set forth in the opinion of the Supreme Court in 
National Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of State Lands, 869 P. 2d 909 
(Utah 1993) (the "NPCA decision"), and are incorporated by reference in this Order. 
2. The land that is the subject of this dispute is a 640 acre section of former state 
school trust land that is located within the boundaries of Capitol Reef National Park in 
Garfield County, and is legally described as section 16, Township 34 South, Range 8 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian (the "Subject Property" or "Section 16"). The Subject 
Property is traversed by a county road known as the Burr Trail, which has been the 
subject of substantial environmental controversy. NPCA, 869 P.2d at 911. 
3. In 1987, Garfield County sought to acquire the Subject Property from the State in 
exchange for several parcels of land owned by the County elsewhere in the County, and 
in the Richfield City Industrial Park. Id; SITLA Statement of Facts ^ 1; Petitioners5 
Statement of Facts ^ 1. 
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4. NPCA sought to intervene in the land exchange proceedings by petition to the 
Division dated October 14, 1987. This petition was denied by the Division on November 
16, 1987. NPCA, 869 P.2d at 912. 
5. NPCA also filed requests for declaratory rulings from the Division with respect to 
the proposed land exchange under a now-repealed statute requiring administrative 
agencies to hear petitions for declaratory rulings, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-15 (repealed 
effective April 25, 1988). On December 21, 1987, the Division denied certain of 
NPCA's requests, and refused to respond to others. Id. 
6. On December 24, 1987, the Governor consummated the land exchange by 
executing a patent conveying the Subject Property to Garfield County. Id. 
7. NPCA subsequently filed a writ of review with the Utah Supreme Court 
challenging the Division's actions in approving the exchange, and the Division's denial 
of its petitions for declaratory rulings. Id. 
The Supreme Court Litigation 
8. In its June 24, 1993 opinion, the Utah Supreme Court determined that NPCA had 
standing to challenge the Division's actions with respect to the exchange. 869 P.2d at 
913-4. The Court then denied NPCA's petition to intervene in the land exchange 
transaction, on the basis that there was no statutory authorization for third-party 
intervention in the state's determination to dispose of real property. Id. at 914-5. 
9. The Supreme Court then addressed NPCA's requests for declaratory rulings, 
which had been denied or not considered by the Division. The Court upheld the 
Division's determinations with respect to the scope and nature of its trust responsibilities 
concerning school trust lands. However, the Court determined that the Division had 
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improperly relied on land appraisals submitted by Garfield County for the lands to be 
exchanged, rather than commissioning its own independent appraisals. The Court found 
that the Division's fiduciary responsibilities to the school trust required it to obtain 
independent appraisals of trust assets before conveying such lands, and that failure to do 
so breached the Division's trust duties. 869 P.2d at 922. 
10. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Division for a determination of 
whether the appraised values of the Subject Property and the lands offered by Garfield 
County represented the full value of those lands. 869 P.2d at 923. 
The Current Valuation Dispute 
11. The Supreme Court denied rehearing in the case on March 26, 1994. On July 1, 
1994, the Division of State Lands & Forestry went out of existence, the legislature having 
transferred responsibility for management of the state's school and institutional trust 
lands to the newly-created School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration pursuant 
to the Utah School and Institutional Trust Lands Management Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
53C-1-101 etseq. 
12. After receiving a third-party request to purchase certain of the exchange lands, 
SITLA determined that the Division had not completed the review of appraised values 
directed by the Supreme Court prior to going out of existence. In order to comply with 
the Supreme Court's direction, SITLA retained an independent appraisal firm, Morley & 
McConkie, L.C., to review valuation of the lands. SITLA Statement of Facts f 16. 
13. On August 25, 2005, Stanford S. McConkie, MAI of Morley & McConkie, L.C. 
submitted a review of valuation of the exchange lands entitled "Limited Restricted Use 
Report: Appraisal of Three Parcels of Land Located in Garfield County and Two 
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Industrial Lots Located in Richfield Sevier County Utah" (the "McConkie Appraisal"). 
SITLA Memorandum, Exhibit B. 
14. The McConkie Appraisal concluded that Section 16 was currently worth 
$200,000, while the County exchange lands were currently worth $661,200. SITLA 
Statement of Facts, U 17. Petitioners dispute the adequacy and accuracy of the McConkie 
Appraisal. Petitioners Statement of Facts, fflf 16-17. 
15. On August 29, 2006, NPCA submitted to SITLA a review of the McConkie 
Appraisal prepared by J. Philip Cook, MAI and Virginia H. Hylton, Appraiser (the "Cook 
Appraisal Review") which evaluated the McConkie Appraisal's compliance with the 
Appraisal Foundation's Uniform Standards for Professional Appraisal Practice 
("USPAP") and with the Appraisal Institute's Code of Professional Ethics and Standards 
of Professional Appraisal Practice. SITLA Statement of Facts, | 19; SITLA 
Memorandum, Exhibit D. 
16. The Cook Appraisal Review found that the McConkie Appraisal complied with 
USPAP standards for a Restricted Use Appraisal Report. The Cook Appraisal Review 
disagreed with Mr. McConkie's determination of the highest and best use of Section 16, 
and of the estimated time to market utilized by Mr. McConkie. The Cook Review 
concluded that the highest and best use of Section 16 was as a secluded single user 
vacation retreat, rather than 40 acre lots as concluded by Mr. McConkie, and that this 
would result in a higher present value than concluded by Mr. McConkie. Cook Appraisal 
Review at 4. 
17. On September 25, 2006, SITLA's Director took formal action and determined 
that, based upon the McConkie Appraisal and SITLA's staff review and concurrence, that 
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the school tmst had obtained full value in the exchange, for purposes of compliance with 
the Supreme Court's remand in the NPCA litigation. SITLA Statement of Facts, % 25; 
SITLA Memorandum, Exhibit H. 
18. Petitioners timely filed their appeal of the Director's decision to approve the 
exchange valuations on September 29, 2006 in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 53C-
1-304(2) and Utah Administrative Code R850-8-1000 (2006). 
The Rulemaking Appeal 
19. On September 29, 2006, NPCA submitted a Petition for Rulemaking to SITLA 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12 and Utah Administrative Code R. 15-2 (2006). 
20. The NPCA Petition for Rulemaking was based upon the following language in the 
Supreme Court's opinion in NPCA: 
We turn now to an issue that is of great importance to this state. Located 
on some state school lands are unique scenic, archaeological, and 
paleontological sites. Such treasures are legacies of past millennia whose 
value could never be expressed in monetary terms. The question is, can 
such treasures be preserved without violating the terms of the school trust? 
We think so.... 
The Division should recognize that some school lands have unique scenic, 
paleontological, and archaeological values that would have little economic 
value on the open market. In some cases, it would be unconscionable not 
to preserve and protect those values. It may be possible for the Division to 
protect and preserve those values without diminishing the economic value 
of the land. For example, with appropriate restrictions it may be possible 
for livestock grazing and perhaps even mineral extraction to occur on a 
school section without damaging archaeological and paleontological sites. 
But when economic exploitation of such lands is not compatible with the 
noneconomic values, the state may have to consider exchanging public 
trust lands or other state lands for school lands. Indeed, it might be 
necessary for the state to buy or lease the school lands from the trust so 
that unique noneconomic values can be preserved and protected, and the 
full economic value of the school trust lands still realized. 
NPCA Petition for Rulemaking, }\ 3, citing NPCA, 869 P. 2d at 920-1 (emphasis added by 
NPCA). 
7 
21. NPCA's Petition for Rulemaking requests that SITLA enact a rule that would: (1) 
require SITLA to take all feasible action to protect trust lands with "unique scenic, 
archaeological, and paleontological sites" or other noneconomic values and provide for 
disposition alternatives that will protect those values while realizing fair economic value 
to the school trust, including at a minimum all trust lands within National and State 
Parks, National Monuments, National Wildlife Refuges, and river corridors nominated 
for Wild and Scenic River status; (2) require SITLA, in consultation with the Governor, 
to take all feasible steps to have the state or federal government acquire the lands for 
protection by purchase or exchange, at fair appraised value; and (3) when appraising 
lands for conservation transactions, take into account all values accruing to the State of 
Utah or the public schools generally accruing from recreation, tourism and educational 
values of protecting the lands, and ecosystem services attributable to retention and 
preservation of the land. NPCA Petition, ffif 1, 2, 4, 5. 
22. On October 5, 2006, SITLA denied NPCA's request for rulemaking. SITLA 
Statement of Facts, % 29; SITLA Memorandum, Exhibit K. NPCA timely appealed the 
denial by letter dated October 18, 2006. 
23. On October 19, 2006, the Board conducted an initial hearing in both 
adjudications pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R850-8-1000(6), and determined 
that it would conduct the adjudication of the two appeals on a consolidated basis as a 
formal adjudicative proceeding pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R850-8-1300. 
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DISCUSSION 
I. Introduction 
The Board has carefully considered the opinion of the Supreme Court in the 
original NPCA litigation. The Supreme Court addressed multiple issues raised by NPCA 
with respect to the disputed land exchange, and finally adjudicated all but one: whether 
the value of the exchange lands conveyed by Garfield County represented fair value to 
the school trust. 869 P. 2d at 922-3. The Court remanded this and only this issue to the 
Division of State Lands & Forestry. 
After the Division failed to address the remand before it went out of existence, 
SITLA staff subsequently discovered the lapse, and, as the current management agency 
for school trust lands, undertook the valuation review. This valuation review was based 
upon an independent appraisal commissioned by the agency, as specifically directed by 
the Supreme Court. The appraisal determined that, in the interval since the land 
exchange, the lands conveyed by Garfield County to the school trust, located near the 
Bryce Canyon airport and in the Richfield City industrial park, had increased in value 
proportionately more than the former Section 16, located inside Capitol Reef National 
Park. The appraiser concluded that the county lands now owned by the school trust were 
approximately 330% of the value of former Section 16, as opposed to a 150% ratio at the 
time of the exchange. Based upon this favorable valuation ratio, the Director of SITLA 
concluded that the exchange remained favorable to the school trust. The Director 
incorporated these conclusions in a formal finding dated September 15, 2006, in order to 
finally address the Supreme Court's direction on remand from the NPCA opinion. 
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The Petitioners appealed the Director's September 15, 2006 finding to the Board 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 53C-l-304(2) and Utah Administrative Code R850-8-1000 
(2006). Petitioners argue that: 
(1) the valuation ratio revealed by the McConkie Appraisal, which 
determined that the county lands conveyed to the school trust were now 
substantially more valuable than Section 16, revealed that the County had 
violated applicable law requiring the County to receive fair value for 
conveying county lands. NPCA Appeal, f^ III(l), (2), at 5-6. 
(2) the McConkie Appraisal, because it was a "Restricted Use Report", i.e. 
a summary valuation report rather than a full narrative appraisal, did not 
satisfy the Supreme Court's requirement of an independent appraisal. 
NPCA Appeal, If 111(3), at 6. 
(3) the McConkie appraisal contains various flaws in its evaluation of 
terrain, presence of water and utilities, and legal constraints associated 
with the parcel's location within the exterior boundaries of Capitol Reef 
National Park. NPCA Appeal, % III(3)(b)-(d), at 7. 
(4) in reviewing valuation of the exchange lands, SITLA should have 
considered the NPCA Court's direction that the State of Utah, when faced 
with the conflict between economic development and protection of certain 
school trust lands with unique scenic, paleontological, and archaeological 
values, may need to ensure protection of those values (in this case by 
voiding the Garfield County exchange and pursuing an alternative 
negotiated conservation transaction). NPCA Appeal, % 111(4), at 9-10. 
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The Board will address each of the Petitioners' contentions in turn. 
II. Alleged Inadequate Consideration for County Lands. 
The McConkie Appraisal found that the lands that the school trust obtained from 
Garfield County in the 1989 exchange had increased in value proportionately more than 
Section 16. At the time of the original exchange, the county lands were valued at 
$98,500, while Section 16 was valued at $65,000, a valuation ratio of 151.5 per cent in 
favor of the school trust. The McConkie appraisal found that by 2005, the value of the 
former county lands had increased to $661,200, while Section 16 had increased in value 
to $200,000, resulting in an increased a valuation ratio of 330.5%. 
NPCA argues that the Board should void the exchange between Garfield County 
and the Division because Utah law required the County to obtain adequate compensation 
in exchange for the county lands, and the 330.5% current valuation ratio indicates that the 
County did not receive adequate compensation. NPCA Appeal at 5-6. NPCA is correct 
that as a general matter, local governments may not dispose of real property without 
adequate compensation. Municipal Building Authority of Iron County v. Lowder, 111 
P.2d 273, 282-3 (Utah 1985); Sears v. Ogden City, 533 P.2d 118, 119 (Utah 1975). 
However, the Board finds that it does not have jurisdiction to set aside the exchange on 
the basis of the County receiving inadequate compensation, because such a determination 
would be both beyond the scope of the Supreme Court's remand, and beyond the Board's 
statutory powers in any event. 
The Supreme Court's remand of the original NPCA case to the Division was 
limited and specific: the Division was to determine whether fc\. .the value of the land 
exchanged for section 16 is adequate under its trust obligations/' 869 P.2d at 923. The 
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Division (and its successor SITLA) was not authorized to undertake a full-fledged review 
of other issues that NPCA might seek to raise at that time; in fact, the Supreme Court 
specifically held that NPCA was not entitled to intervene at the agency level to challenge 
the Division's executive determination to convey lands, since to allow private entities to 
force adjudication of any of the myriad realty transactions undertaken by the state could 
paralyze the state's ability to acquire and dispose of property. 869 P.2d at 914, citing 
Terracor v. Utah Bd. of State Lands, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986). The Supreme Court 
stated that the appropriate method of challenging a purportedly illegal conveyance would 
be through an action for injunctive relief in the District Court, where a factual record 
could be developed and the legality of the agency action tested against governing law. Id. 
NPCA would have SITLA, and this Board, unilaterally determine that Garfield 
County acted illegally when it conveyed the lands to the State of Utah because the 
County allegedly did not receive adequate compensation. This determination would be 
well beyond the scope of the Supreme Court's specific remand, which was limited to 
determination of the adequacy of compensation to the school trust. The Board also points 
out that the imbalance between the value of lands granted by the county and section 16 
was expressly noted by the Supreme Court. 869 P.2d at 912. NPCA could have raised 
this issue at that time, either before the Supreme Court or in an independent action. By 
failing to raise the imbalance issue at that time, NPCA is now barred by the doctrine of 
res judicata from raising the issue now. Penrodv. Nu Creation Creme, Inc., 669 P. 2d 
873, 875 (Utah 1983). . 
NPCA's contentions would also require the Board to act beyond its jurisdiction. 
In its statutory capacity as an adjudicative body, the SITLA Board's jurisdiction is 
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limited to the powers expressly granted to it by the Utah legislature. High Country 
Estates Homeowners Ass 'n v. Bagley & Company, 901 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1995), on 
remand 928 P.2d 1047, cert. den. 937 P.2d 137; Bevans v. Industrial Comm 'n of Utah, 
790 P.2d 573, 576 (Utah App. 1990). Here, the legislature has not given this Board the 
authority to adjudicate whether Garfield County exceeded its powers by conveying lands 
for purportedly inadequate consideration. Title to Section 16 has been in Garfield County 
for almost 20 years. Neither SITLA not the Board has any legislatively-granted power to 
unilaterally adjudicate that a prior conveyance by the State was invalid because of the 
grantee's lack of authority.That is the role of the courts, a role that this Board will not 
usurp. 
III. Adequacy of the McConkie Appraisal. 
A. Legal Adequacy of a Restricted Use Appraisal. 
NPCA next argues that SITLA's use of a restricted appraisal report, instead of a 
full narrative appraisal, did not satisfy the Supreme Court's directive on remand that the 
Division determine whether value of the land exchanged for Section 16 represented full 
and adequate value for the school trust. The report relied upon by SITLA was prepared 
by Stanford S. McConkie, MAI and was entitled "Limited Restricted Use Report: 
Appraisal of Three Parcels of Land Located in Garfield County and Two Industrial Lots 
Located in Richfield Sevier County Utah." Counsel for SITLA stated at oral argument 
that a restricted appraisal, rather than a full narrative appraisal, was deemed adequate by 
SITLA for the agency's internal review of the valuation of the exchange parcels, and was 
less expensive than a narrative appraisal. Transcript at 28-29. The McConkie Appraisal 
states that it was intended as a Restricted Use Appraisal Report set forth under Standards 
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Rule 2-2(c) of the Uniform Standards for Professional Appraisal Practice ("USPAP"), 
and was the result of a limited appraisal process that departed in some respects from 
specific USPAP guidelines, which could impact the reliability of the value conclusions 
provided. McConkie Appraisal at 2. 
NPCA obtained a review of the McConkie Appraisal from J. Philip Cook, MAI, 
which was dated July 25, 2006. The Cook Review stated that the McConkie Appraisal 
was compliant in form with USPAP and with the Appraisal Institute's Code of 
Professional Ethics and Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. Cook Review at 4. 
However, Mr. Cook noted that he disagreed with the McConkie report's assumption that 
the highest and best use of Section 16 could be obtained by subdividing the property into 
40 acre lots. Mr. Cook concluded that the highest and best use of Section 16 was to 
market the property as a single large parcel to an out-of-state investor for exclusive 
vacation use. A corollary of this conclusion was that Mr. Cook felt that Mr. McConkie 
had overestimated the marketing time for the property, which would be less for a single 
sale than for multiple lots. In its briefing, NPCA also argued that the McConkie appraisal 
had failed to consider the location of Section 16 inside Capitol Reef National Park, which 
NPCA alleged would preclude any use inconsistent with park purposes, depressing the 
value of the parcel. NPCA Opposition at 7-10. 
NPCA's arguments require the Board to answer two questions about the 
McConkie appraisal. First, based upon the facts alleged by NPCA, was SITLA's use of a 
restricted use appraisal sufficient as a matter of law to meet the Supreme Court's mandate 
on remand? If so, what is the legal effect of the alleged factual errors in the McConkie 
appraisal? 
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The Board concludes that SITLA's use of a restricted use appraisal was sufficient 
to meet the Supreme Court's mandate. The Supreme Court specifically directed the 
Division to determine independently (i.e. without reliance on Garfield County's 
appraisals) whether full compensation had been achieved by the school trust. In 
USPAP's discussions of allowable types of appraisals, the Appraisal Foundation 
specifically states: "When the intended users do not include parties other than the client, a 
Restricted Use Appraisal Report may be provided." USPAP Standards Rule 2-2, 
Comment, available at http://commerce.appraisal foundation.org. USPAP Standard 2-
2(c) sets specific standards for this type of appraisal. Id. Although Mr. Cook disagreed 
with factual conclusions drawn by Mr. McConkie as to highest and best use, he stated 
that the McConkie appraisal was compliant with all requirements of USPAP for such an 
appraisal. Because the directive of the Supreme Court in NPCA was for the Division to 
determine for the benefit of the school trust whether value had been achieved, a restricted 
use appraisal (as defined and controlled by USPAP Standard 2, as was the case with the 
McConkie appraisal), was legally sufficient. The Supreme Court's directive was for an 
independent review of valuation, which was accomplished. 
B. Technical Disputes with the McConkie Appraisal; Standing. 
NPCA asserts that the McConkie Appraisal incorrectly assessed the terrain and 
utility access situation for Section 16, and disregarded the impact of the parcel's location 
inside Capitol Reef National Park on the parcels' value. The Board must assume for the 
purposes of the pending motion that NPCA's assertions are correct. That said, the Board 
is free to note that NPCA's factual contentions on valuation issues are so contradictory as 
to be impossible to reconcile. NPCA's principal argument, discussed above, is that the 
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exchange was illegal because the school trust received too much, with Garfield County 
receiving allegedly inadequate consideration. NPCA's review appraiser, Mr. Cook 
criticizes the McConkie Appraisal for using exposure times and a highest and best use 
that would lead to a reduced value conclusion, in contrast to Mr. Cook's conclusion that 
the section would have substantial value as a private retreat. NPCA then devotes 
substantial argument to the exact opposite proposition — that Section 16 is not worth 
much of anything, both because it is located within Capitol Reef National Park, and 
purportedly subject to National Park Service regulations that would preclude economic 
use, and because of adverse terrain and utility access. Transcript at 17-19. 
The Board need not resolve these inconsistencies. In NPCA, the Supreme Court 
specifically denied NPCA the right to intervene in the exchange transaction. The Court 
articulated the sound policy for denying third party intervention into executive real 
property decisions: 
The reason for allowing the state to deal with leasing, selling, and 
exchanging property as an executive decision is not difficult to ascertain. 
The state, through its various agencies, engages in innumerable 
transactions for the purchase, sale, exchange, and lease of real and 
personal property. If these transactions were subject to the delay inherent 
in adjudicative proceedings at the demand of a third party asserting a 
private interest, government programs dealing with the acquisition and 
disposition of property could be paralyzed. See Terracor v. Utah Bd. Of 
State Lands, 716 P. 2d 796 (Utah 1986). 
869 P. 2d at 914. In the Terracor case cited by the NPCA court, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that, in dispositions of school trust properties, the school trust beneficiaries are the 
most appropriate party to challenge a conveyance of trust lands, and that third parties 
would not have standing to do so. See also Forest Guardians v. Powell, 24 P.3d 803 
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(N.M. App. 2001)(conservation groups lack standing to assert the interests of trust 
beneficiaries in challenge to school trust actions). 
In the original NPCA litigation, the Supreme Court granted NPCA standing to 
raise a policy issue: the overall scope and nature of the state's school trust obligation. 
At the same time, it declined on policy grounds to allow NPCA to intervene in the State's 
executive decisionmaking concerning the conveyance of lands. The Board finds that, on 
remand, the Petitioners do not have standing to attack SITLA's substantive internal 
decisionmaking concerning the specific values of the lands committed to a state land 
exchange. Indeed, the contradictory quilt of valuation assertions made by NPCA 
illustrates the Supreme Court's wisdom in insulating executive real estate decisions from 
the adjudicative process. If third parties could take issue with multiple aspects of the 
value of trust lands in every trust lands exchange or sale, the school trust would, as the 
Supreme Court warned, risk paralysis in fulfilling its statutory purpose. The purpose of 
the Supreme Court's remand was for the Division/SITLA to obtain an independent 
valuation of the exchange lands and determine adequacy for purposes of the state's trust 
beneficiaries. That direction has unquestionably been fulfilled. 
IV. Consideration of the Unique Attributes of Section 16 under NPCA. 
NPCA next argues that SITLA's approval of the exchange values on remand 
violated two duties enunciated by the Supreme Court in the NPCA opinion. First, NPCA 
claims that SITLA violated the Supreme Court's comment that: 
The Division should recognize that some school lands have unique scenic, 
paleontological, and archaeological values that would have little economic 
value on the open market, hi some cases, it would be unconscionable not 
to preserve and protect those values.... [W]hen economic exploitation of 
such lands is not compatible with the noneconomic values, the state may 
have to consider exchanging public trust lands or other state lands for 
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school lands. Indeed, it might be necessary for the state to buy or lease the 
school lands from the trust so that unique noneconomic values can be 
preserved and protected, and the full economic value of the school trust 
lands still realized. 869 P.2d at 921. 
Second, NPCA contends that SITLA violated the principle enunciated by the Court that 
trustees, including the State as trustee of Utah's school trust, have a duty to act in 
accordance with applicable law. NPCA argues that by allowing Garfield County to 
receive inadequate compensation, and by approving a transaction that NPCA believes 
does not comply with the Court's statement regarding protection of non-economic values, 
SITLA is violating applicable law. NPCA Appeal at 9-10. 
The Board believes that NPCA has completely misconstrued the obligation placed 
on SITLA by the NPCA opinion, as it relates to the case now before the Board. . The 
Supreme Court stated that "in some cases" the State may have the obligation to protect 
unique noneconomic values on trust lands by considering exchange or protective 
purchase of the lands. However, it found that the Division had in fact adequately 
considered aesthetic and recreational values in deciding to exchange Section 16. 869 
P.2d at 921. It further found that the Board of State Lands & Forestry had acted correctly 
in refusing to give priority to the scenic, aesthetic, and recreational values of section 16 
over economic values when it approved the exchange. Id. 
The Supreme Court has thus fully adjudicated the issues raised by NPCA here. 
The Supreme Court's determination is binding on NPCA, and on this Board, as res 
judicata. All are beyond the scope of the Supreme Court's remand to the Division. 
Indeed, the Board is mystified as to how NPCA believes that the Board could, twenty 
years after conveyance of Section 16 to Garfield County and thirteen years after the 
Supreme Court's mling on tiiese issues, somehow have the power to divest the County of 
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title to Section 16 and unwind the exchange in opposition to the Supreme Court's ruling 
to the contrary. NPCA's claims that SITLA violated the NPCA decision in this regard 
fail as a matter of law. 
V. Separation and Further Consideration of NPCA's Petition for Rulemaking. 
Contemporaneously with its appeal of SITLA's decision to approve the land 
exchange values on remand from the Supreme Court, NPCA filed a petition for 
rulemaking with SITLA pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-12 and Utah 
Administrative Code R. 15-2 (2006). NPCA's Petition for Rulemaking was based on the 
language in the NPCA decision concerning the State's obligation in some cases to protect 
trust lands with "unique" noneconomic characteristics. NPCA requested that the 
proposed rule: (1) require SITLA to take all feasible action to protect trust lands with 
"unique scenic, archaeological, and paleontological sites" or other noneconomic values 
and provide for disposition alternatives that will protect those values while realizing fair 
economic value to the school trust, including at a minimum all trust lands within National 
and State Parks, National Monuments, National Wildlife Refuges, and river corridors 
nominated for Wild and Scenic River status; (2) require SITLA, in consultation with the 
Governor, to take all feasible steps to have the state or federal government acquire the 
lands for protection by purchase or exchange, at fair appraised value; and (3) when 
appraising lands for conservation transactions, take into account all values accruing to the 
State of Utah or the public schools generally accruing from recreation, tourism and 
educational values of protecting the lands, and ecosystem services attributable to 
retention and preservation of the land. NPCA Petition. | | 1, 2, 4, 5. SITLA denied the 
Petition for Rulemaking on October 5, 2006, and NPCx\ appealed. The Board 
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subsequently consolidated NPCA's appeal of SITLA's decision in the Supreme Court 
remand with the rulemaking appeal. 
The basis for SITLA's denial of the rulemaking petition was that the non-
economic values described in the NPCA decision could be protected without a rule that 
would limit SITLA's discretionary authority to manage trust lands in the most effective 
manner possible for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries. SITLA also noted the Board's 
decision in a prior adjudication to the effect that such a rule would unduly hamper the 
agency's ability to administer trust lands in a manner "most favorable to the 
beneficiaries" as required by Utah Code Ann. § 53C-l-302(b)(iv). 
The Board notes that many issues of concern to the conservation community 
concerning trust lands at the time of the NPCA decision have been resolved in accordance 
with the Supreme Court's directive that trust values and economic values be reconciled 
where possible. For example, all state trust lands located within National Parks, National 
Monuments, and National Recreation Areas have been exchanged to the United States. 
Similar land exchanges have removed or are proposed to remove trust lands from 
proposed wilderness areas, endangered species habitat, and scenic river corridors. State 
laws with respect to archaeological and paleontological resources on trust lands - of 
specific concern to the NPCA court - have been significantly strengthened. 
The Board is not convinced at this time that rulemaking - particularly as 
restrictive as that proposed by NPCA - is necessary or desirable to reconcile the interests 
of the trust beneficiaries and the interests of conservation. Nonetheless, in its 
policymaking capacity, the Board intends during the current fiscal year to study policy 
issues presented by the rulemaking petition and related issues with respect to public 
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interests in trust lands. SITLA's Motion to Dismiss NPCA's rulemaking petition will be 
taken under advisement pending such study. The Board reserves the right to request that 
the parties submit additional briefing or argument during this period. 
Because the Board finds that the issues presented by Petitioners' appeal of the 
agency's approval of the land exchange valuation on remand are separate from the policy 
issue associated with the rulemaking petition, and because the exchange appeal may be 
resolved as a matter of law, the Board has determined that the two appeals should be 
separated. The Board's order with respect to the exchange valuation appeal will 
constitute a final order of the Board in that matter. The rulemaking appeal will be 
retained within the jurisdiction of the Board, and decided separately. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Board has jurisdiction to conduct these formal adjudicative proceedings 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 53C-l-304(2). 
2. In Petitioners' appeal of SITLA's approval of land exchange values for State 
Exchange No. 188 on remand from the Utah Supreme Court, the Board concludes: 
a. Petitioners' claims that SITLA's approval was wrongful because Garfield 
County received inadequate compensation are beyond the scope of the Supreme Court's 
remand and beyond the jurisdiction of the Board to determine. 
b. Petitioners' claims that the McConkie Appraisal, as a Restricted Use 
Appraisal, was legally inadequate to satisfy the Supreme Court's mandate on remand are 
incorrect. The Board concludes that a Restricted Use Appraisal that complies with the 
Appraisal Foundation's Uniform Standards for Professional Appraisal Practice with 
respect to such appraisals was legally sufficient to permit SITLA to ascertain that the 
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exchange values satisfied the State's trust responsibilities, as directed by the Supreme 
Court. 
c. Neither SITLA nor the Board are obligated as a matter of law to consider 
Petitioners' factual disputes with the McConkie appraisal with respect to issues such as 
highest and best use, utility access, restrictions on use imposed by the National Park 
Service, etc., because Petitioners lack standing to challenge specific valuation issues. 
d. Petitioners' claims that SITLA's approval of the exchange values on 
remand violated applicable law or the directives contained in the NPCA opinion are 
incorrect. Petitioners' claims that the value approval should have considered the unique 
properties of Section 16 are barred by res judicata. 
3. Because Petitioners' have failed, based upon the undisputed facts, to state a claim 
that SITLA's approval of land exchange values for State Exchange No. 188 on remand 
from the Utah Supreme Court was unlaw&l, Petitioner's appeal of such approval must be 
dismissed. 
ORDER 
1. Petitioners' appeal of SITLA's approval of land exchange values for State 
Exchange No. 188 on remand from the Utah Supreme Court is denied. 
2. NPCA's appeal of SITLA's denial of its September 18, 2006 Petition for 
Rulemaking is separated from Petitioners' appeal of land exchange values. The 
rulemaking appeal is retained under advisement by the Board, subject to further 
deliberation by the Board with respect to Board policy. 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION OR JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 
Any party affected by a final order or decision by the Board may file a petition for 
reconsideration and modification of an existing order within 20 days after the date the 
Order was issued by complying with Utah Admin Code R. 850-8-1700. 
Any party may request judicial review of this Order by complying with the 
requirements of Utah Admin. Code R850-8-1300(3)(a) and (b), and R850-8-1900, which 
require a party seeking judicial review to: (1) file a petition for judicial review of a final 
order issued by the Board within 30 days after the date the order is issued or considered 
issued; (2) name the School and Institutional Trust Lauds Administration and all other 
appropriate parties as respondents; and (3) file a petition for review of the Order with the 
appropriate court in the manner required by Utah Code Ann. §63-46-b-15 or §63-46b-16, 
as appropriate. IN THE EVENT A PETITION IS NOT FILED WITHIN THE 30 DAY 
TIMS PERIOD, THIS ORDER WILL BECOME FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE.. 
SO ORDERED BY THE BOARD THIS ]_3_ day of September, 2007. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this h& day of September, 2007, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINAL ORDER: (1) SEPARATING ADJUDICATIVE PROCEEDINGS; 
AND (2) GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL OF AGENCY 
ACTION RE EXCHANGE NO. 188 was sent to the following: 
TO: VIA: 
Wayne G. Petty 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Facsimile: 801-521-9015 
Email: wayne@,moylelawfirm.com. 
William J. Lockhart 
5604 Pioneer Fork Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
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*i 
_i_ 
US Mail 
Facsimile 
Email 
Hand delivery 
US Mail 
Facsimile 
Email 
Hand delivery 
Thomas A. Mitchell 
Counsel for 
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Trust Lands Administration 
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